

THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today  
(1) was not written for publication in a law journal and  
(2) is not binding precedent of the Board.

Paper No. 218

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
AND INTERFERENCES

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PANKAJ K. MEHROTRA and ELIZABETH R. BILLMAN,

Junior Party,

v.

PANKAJ K. MEHROTRA and ELIZABETH R. BILLMAN,

Junior Party,

v.

JUNICHIRO SUZUKI and SHOJI SAKAKIBARA,

Junior Party,

v.

EUGENE M. AUGUSTINE,

Senior Party.

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Patent Interference 102,712

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FINAL HEARING: OCT. 26, 1999

Before CAROFF, METZ and LORIN, Administrative Patent Judges.  
CAROFF, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL DECISION [37 CFR § 1.658(a)]

Originally, this interference involved eight parties. Judgment has already been entered against Valentian (Paper No. 40), Tani (Paper No. 130), Buljan et al. (Paper No. 142), Jun et al. (Paper No. 217) and Engstrom (Paper No. 217). The remaining parties are Mehrotra et al. (Mehrotra), Suzuki et al. (Suzuki) and Augustine, each having an application involved in the interference. Mehrotra also has a patent involved in the interference.

According to the record before us, Mehrotra's application and patent are each assigned to Kennametal Inc. (Kennametal); the Suzuki application is assigned to NGK Spark Plug Co., Ltd.;<sup>1</sup> and the Augustine application is assigned to Greenleaf Corporation (Greenleaf).

The subject matter in issue relates to a coated ceramic product which may be used as a composite ceramic cutting tool

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<sup>1</sup>Suzuki's assignee is identified on page ii of the Suzuki Brief.

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or cutting insert. This product is more specifically defined by the following count, the sole count in this interference:

Count 1

A coated ceramic product comprising:

a. a ceramic substrate body comprising a ceramic matrix having distributed therethrough reinforcing whiskers; and

b. at least one thin adherent chemical and friction resistant coating layer applied to said substrate body.

The claims of the parties which correspond to this count are:

Mehrotra (application): Claims 1-31, 34-46

Mehrotra (patent): Claims 1-40

Suzuki: Claims 1, 3, 4, 15, 16, 18, 19

Augustine: Claims 1-60

Issues

The following matters were raised in the parties' briefs and, therefore, define the only issues before us for consideration:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Each of the preliminary motions listed is identified by the numerical designation assigned to it in the Decision on Motions of Aug. 3, 1993 (Paper No. 131), and the disposition of each motion by the Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) is

I. Whether evidence adduced by junior party Mehrotra is sufficient to establish a date of invention prior to senior party Augustine's effective filing date of May 5, 1986.

II. If Mehrotra is found to have established a date of invention prior to Augustine's effective filing date, whether Augustine has adduced sufficient evidence to establish an even earlier date of invention.

III. Suzuki motion to designate all of its involved claims as not corresponding to the count (Motion 3: denied).

IV. Suzuki motion for judgment that all the involved Augustine claims are unpatentable for failure to satisfy the "best mode" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (Motion 5: deferred to final hearing).

V. Augustine motion to suppress evidence (Paper No. 191).

Each of the parties has presented a testimonial record, submitted exhibits, filed briefs and appeared, through counsel, at final hearing.<sup>3</sup>

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indicated in parentheses.

<sup>3</sup>The record, exhibits, brief and reply brief of Mehrotra will hereinafter be respectively referred to by the abbreviations "MR", "MX", "MB" and "MRB" followed by an appropriate page or exhibit number. Similar abbreviations will be used when referring to the record, exhibits and briefs of Suzuki (SR, SX, SB, SRB) and Augustine (AR, AX, AB, ARB).

OPINION

After a thorough evaluation of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding in light of the opposing positions taken by the parties in their briefs, we agree with senior party Augustine, essentially for the reasons presented in its brief and reply brief, that:

(a) Mehrotra's case for priority is fatally deficient for lack of adequate corroboration;

(b) Augustine has established respective dates of conception and reduction to practice earlier than any of those alleged by Mehrotra;

(c) Suzuki has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its involved claims should be designated as not corresponding to the count; and

(d) Suzuki has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Augustine's involved application does not satisfy the "best mode" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

Accordingly, judgment shall be entered against both Mehrotra and Suzuki.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>We note that Suzuki is a junior party and has not put on a case for priority. Indeed, Suzuki did not allege any date in its preliminary statement prior to Augustine's filing date.

We shall now discuss each issue seriatim to highlight the reasoning upon which our conclusions are based.

I. Mehrotra's Case for Priority

Mehrotra, being a junior party, has the burden of proving prior inventorship by a preponderance of the evidence. Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651-52, 190 USPQ 117, 120-21 (CCPA 1976).

Mehrotra alleges conception and actual reduction to practice of the invention defined by the count prior to Augustine's filing date. Mehrotra also alleges that it was first to conceive and exercised reasonable diligence in actually or constructively reducing the invention to practice. In attempting to prove these allegations, Mehrotra relies upon an evidentiary record solely consisting of the testimony of co-inventor Mehrotra together with documentary exhibits. Only Mehrotra testified, and no one else testified as to any activities or dates referred to in the documentary exhibits. Under these circumstances, we totally agree with Augustine

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that Mehrotra's case for priority fails for lack of corroboration.

The need for corroboration of an inventor's testimony in establishing a case for priority is a fundamental and well-established principle of interference practice. Rivise and Caesar, Interference Law and Practice, Vol. III, section 539 (Michie Co. 1947).

The purpose of the rule requiring corroboration is to reduce the potential for fraud and to establish, by proof that is unlikely to have been fabricated or falsified, that the inventor successfully reduced his invention to practice. Berry v. Webb, 412 F.2d 261, 266-67, 162 USPQ 170, 174 (CCPA 1969). The evidence necessary for corroboration is determined by the rule of reason which involves an examination, analysis and evaluation of the record as a whole to the end that a reasoned determination as to the credibility of the inventor's story may be reached. Berges v. Gottstein, 618 F.2d 771, 774, 205 USPQ 691, 694 (CCPA 1980); Mann v. Werner, 347 F.2d 636, 640, 146 USPQ 199, 202 (CCPA 1965). Although adoption of the "rule of reason" has eased the requirement of corroboration with respect to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish

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the inventor's credibility, it has not altered the requirement that corroborative evidence must not depend solely on the inventor himself and must be independent of information received from the inventor. Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 1225, 211 USPQ 936, 940 (CCPA 1981); Mikus v. Watchtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1159, 191 USPQ 571, 573 (CCPA 1976).

Mehrotra is apparently of the view that documentary evidence alone is sufficient to corroborate an inventor's testimony. To support this proposition, Mehrotra relies upon Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1239, 20 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195-96, 26 USPQ2d 1031, 1037-38 (Fed. Cir. 1993). These cases do not support Mehrotra's position since, in Holmwood, corroboration was established through the testimony of Dr. Zeck who was not an inventor. Similarly, in Price, testimony independent of that of the inventor was offered to corroborate the inventor's testimony regarding the date of preparation of a critical documentary exhibit.

The operative facts establishing corroboration in Holmwood and Price are not present here. Here, Mehrotra solely relies upon documentation, reputed to have been



contemporaneously prepared, to corroborate inventor testimony as to both conception and reduction to practice. Only co-inventor Mehrotra testified as to those documents. In the absence of any independent testimony regarding the authenticity of those documents, we find that the documents by themselves do not provide the necessary corroboration of the inventor's testimony.

Furthermore, we note that Mehrotra primarily relies upon a progress report (MX-3) to corroborate an actual reduction to practice. We agree with Augustine (ARB-17) that even if the activities reported in the last sentence on page 2 of the document are accepted at face value, there is no indication in the document that testing of the coated ceramic product to establish its utility had been completed as of the alleged date of the report. The report only indicates that "further evaluation is underway." Accordingly, the report, even if accepted at face value and taken in conjunction with Mehrotra's testimony (MR 47-50), is insufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice as of June 26, 1985. Reduction to practice of a product is generally not considered as complete until it has been successfully tested to establish

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its utility. See Gordon v. Hubbard, 347 F.2d 1001, 1006-07, 146 USPQ 303, 307-08 (CCPA 1965)

For the foregoing reasons, judgment against Mehrotra is in order.

## II. Augustine's Case for Priority

There is no need to consider Augustine's case with respect to the issue of prior inventorship as Augustine is the senior party in this interference with an effective filing date of May 5, 1986, and no junior party has established an earlier date of invention. However, for the sake of completeness, we have reviewed Augustine's case for priority. Having done so, we find that Augustine has established respective dates of conception and reduction to practice earlier than any of those alleged by Mehrotra.

Augustine's position can be summarized as follows: Rolf Kraemer, a Greenleaf product manager, worked closely with Augustine during the time in question (AR-195). Kraemer and others corroborate disclosure by Augustine of the invention defined by the count at an R&D meeting held in the middle of 1984, on or about June 2, 1984 (AR 196-197, 213; AX-13). The idea was to apply a thin adherent  $\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3$  coating to whisker-reinforced ceramic cutting tools for the purpose of providing

a chemical and friction resistant layer on the whisker-reinforced ceramic substrate in order to obtain improved wear resistance and tool life. Kraemer was asked to carry out tests to evaluate the concept. Such tests were conducted, and Kraemer reported on March 22, 1985 that improved results were obtained when cutting 4150 steel (AR 198-202; AX-15(Test 2, Test 3)).

In our opinion, the evidence adduced by Augustine is sufficient to establish conception of the invention at issue by June 2, 1984, and an actual reduction to practice of that invention by March 22, 1985.

Mehrotra would have us find otherwise. According to Mehrotra, disappointing results reported by Kraemer on July 18, 1985 (AX-16; AR 385-87) raise doubts as to whether the earlier tests relied upon by Augustine were sufficient to establish that the invention at issue had been successfully reduced to practice. We find this argument unpersuasive. On the basis of the earlier test results (AX-15), Kraemer and others were satisfied that at least one particular embodiment of the Augustine invention "was satisfactory for use as a cutting tool material and that the  $\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3$  coating provided an effective chemical and friction resistant layer on the WG-300

substrate" (AR-202, 216, 227). Successful testing of a single embodiment within the scope of the count is sufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice. See Breuer v. DeMarinis, 558 F.2d 22, 24, footnote 5, 194 USPQ 308, 309, footnote 5 (CCPA 1977). Kraemer explained that the disappointing results encountered in the later tests (AX-16) were apparently due to a structural defect in the cutting tool insert. However, Kraemer apparently did not believe that this cast doubt on the utility of the Augustine invention (AR-203). Subsequent development testing does not necessarily negate a prior reduction to practice. See Tomecek v. Stimpson, 513 F.2d 614, 619, 185 USPQ 235, 239 (CCPA 1975).

Other questions raised by Mehrotra concerning Augustine's priority case have been adequately addressed in Augustine's brief and reply brief. To wit, with regard to whether the cutting tool reduced to practice by Augustine included a coating which exhibited chemical and friction resistance, Kraemer was satisfied that the coating provided an effective chemical and friction resistant layer (AR-202). Augustine testified that wear resistance is a measure of both chemical and friction resistance (AR-330). Kraemer confirmed that good friction resistance and

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good chemical resistance generally follow from a demonstration of good wear resistance (AR-196, 382-83). Mehrotra has not shown otherwise.

With regard to whether the so-called in-house screening tests conducted by Kraemer (AR 381-82) adequately duplicated actual working conditions, Kraemer and others were satisfied that the results shown in AX-15 established that the Augustine invention was useful for its intended purpose (AR-191, 202, 216, 227). This is all that is required for reduction to practice. Screening, bench-scale or laboratory tests can be relied upon as long as they are representative of the intended use of the invention. See Tomecek v. Stimpson, *supra*, 513 F.2d at 618-19, 185 USPQ at 238-39; Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062, 32 USPQ2d 1115, 1118-19 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Mehrotra has not otherwise established that the tests conducted by Kraemer did not adequately simulate conditions encountered in commercial machining operations.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Augustine has established respective dates of conception and reduction to practice earlier than any of those alleged by Mehrotra.

### III. Correspondence of Suzuki's Claims to the Count

We find that Suzuki's motion to designate its claims as not corresponding to the count was properly denied essentially for the reasons outlined in Augustine's brief and reply brief. Suzuki, as the moving party, bears the burden of persuasion as to the relief sought. See Behr v. Talbott, 27 USPQ2d 1401, 1405 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992); Case v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 750, 221 USPQ 196, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984). The movant's burden is to establish that its involved claims do not define "the same patentable invention" as any other claim designated as corresponding to the count. 37 CFR § 1.637(c)(4)(ii). In determining whether a particular claim or claims define "the same patentable invention" as any other involved claim, a question of obviousness arises within the purview of 35 U.S.C. § 103 with the assumption being made that the other involved claims represent prior art with respect to the claim or claims in question. 37 CFR § 1.601(n). It goes without saying that any inquiry relating to the question of obviousness must also necessarily involve an evaluation of any conventional prior art within the purview of 35 U.S.C. § 102.

At the outset, we note that Suzuki's brief refers to matters which were not raised in its original preliminary

motion (Motion 3) or associated reply (Paper No. 110). To wit, Suzuki did not single out claims 16, 18/16 and 19 for separate treatment in the motion or reply. Also, all the evidentiary material referred to on page 80 of Suzuki's brief, which purportedly relates to results of comparative tests, was not cited or discussed in the subject motion or reply. Such matters, which were not argued before the APJ during the preliminary motion period with regard to the particular motion at issue, are not entitled to consideration at final hearing. See Heymes v. Takaya, 6 USPQ2d 1448, 1452 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988); Bayles v. Elbe, 16 USPQ2d 1389, 1391 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990).

The fact that the evidentiary material in question may have been filed and discussed in connection with another preliminary motion is of no avail to Suzuki with regard to its consideration in connection with the instant motion. The APJ could not be expected to make out a case for separate patentability on Suzuki's behalf based on evidence not even cited or discussed in the relevant motion. That was Suzuki's burden. Cf. Jacobs v. Moriarity, 6 USPQ2d 1799, 1802 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988). All the supporting facts and reasons upon which the movant intends to rely must be stated in the

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motion. 37 CFR § 1.637(a). Suzuki has not shown good cause why this was not done.

As to the merits, it has been found (Decision on Motions, pages 13-14) that Augustine claim 20 is a generic claim to a coated ceramic cutting tool comprising a ceramic substrate, including a ceramic matrix and reinforcing whiskers, and an adherent chemical and friction resistant coating layer. Suzuki does not dispute that this generic claim embraces the subject matter set forth in its involved claims. In addition, Augustine's dependent claims clearly point to use of the particular matrix and coating materials recited in Suzuki's claims. To wit, Augustine claim 23 specifically refers to TiC as a matrix material, and Augustine claim 21 specifically refers to three of the six titanium coating layer compounds recited in Suzuki's claims. Also, as noted by Augustine, Augustine claims 31-60 all refer to SiC as a whisker material, albeit in association with an alumina matrix. Moreover, the APJ found, and Suzuki apparently does not dispute, that SiC is recognized in the prior art (Ekstrom UK patent application 2,157,282 - attachment to Paper No. 47) as an alternative whisker material for use in ceramic cutting tool substrates.



In view of the foregoing, the APJ concluded that the cutting tool defined by Suzuki's involved claims would have been prima facie obvious within the context of 35 U.S.C. § 103 from the subject matter embraced by Augustine's involved claims especially when taken in view of knowledge available in the prior art, as represented by the Ekstrom UK reference. We most emphatically agree.

As a basis for contesting the denial of its motion, Suzuki argues that a generic disclosure does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of obviousness as to a species. In support of this proposition, Suzuki primarily relies upon In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 382, 29 USPQ2d 1550, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 350, 21 USPQ2d 1941, 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We agree with Augustine that Baird and Jones are distinguishable on their facts since, here, Augustine's claims are not merely generic but, also, specifically recite Suzuki's matrix material (TiC) and coating materials (TiC, TiN, TiCN) in a Markush group format. In addition, some of Augustine's claims, as well as the Ekstrom UK reference, point specifically to SiC whiskers for use as a reinforcing material in ceramic cutting tools. In contradistinction, the prior art involved in Baird and Jones

apparently did not include any specific reference whatsoever to the particular materials or species embodied in the claims at issue. Also, in Jones, the secondary art under consideration was in a field that was unrelated to the herbicide field of the primary reference.

For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Augustine that Suzuki's motion to designate all of its involved claims as not corresponding to the count was properly denied. Since Suzuki is a junior party and has not presented a case for priority, judgment against Suzuki is in order.

#### IV. Augustine's Compliance with the "Best Mode" Requirement

Based upon the record before us, we find that Suzuki has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Augustine's involved application does not satisfy the "best mode" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Accordingly, Suzuki's corresponding motion for judgment is denied. Suzuki, as the moving party, bears the burden of persuasion on this issue. See Behr v. Talbott, supra, and Weil v. Fritz, 601 F.2d 551, 555, 202 USPQ 447, 450 (CCPA 1979).

Initially, we note that Suzuki's position regarding Augustine's alleged lack of compliance with the best mode

requirement is primarily based upon Augustine's extensive use of "WG-300" cutting tools during testing and development of his invention. According to Suzuki, this fact and related testimony establish that Augustine specifically contemplated a "best mode" of carrying out his invention at the time he filed his patent application, and that best mode involved the application of an alumina coating to a WG-300 cutting tool.

The designation "WG-300" refers to a specific cutting tool made by Greenleaf Corporation from HA9S material. The HA9S starting material was available from ARCO, a division of Atlantic Richfield Company, as an alumina matrix reinforced with silicon carbide whiskers (AR-5, 169, 184). WG-300 is not referred to by name in the Augustine application, nor are the specific details of its manufacture and composition disclosed (SB 18-19). This is undisputed. However, the Augustine application at pages 7-12 does disclose preferred materials, compositions and processing parameters for manufacture of suitable ceramic substrates and coating layers for cutting tool applications. Also, the WG-300 embodiment was commercially available from the Greenleaf Corporation (SR-183), and readily available to Augustine and his co-workers as an "off-the-shelf" item (SR-150).

Suzuki relies heavily upon statements made by Augustine which at first appear to suggest that the WG-300 substrate was indeed considered to be "best" for carrying out his invention (AR-4, 89-93; SR-183). However, we agree with Augustine that this testimony and other evidence relied upon by Suzuki is consistent with Augustine's view of the facts, as aptly expressed at ARB-40, 44-50 and 91. According to this view, which we believe represents a more accurate and comprehensive assessment of all the evidence before us, WG-300 was chosen as a substrate for testing purposes primarily because of its ready availability, and not necessarily because Augustine considered it to be better than any other SiC whisker-reinforced alumina substrate, the generic category of preferred substrate materials disclosed by Augustine. Augustine's "best mode" encompassed more than just WG-300. To the extent Augustine may have contemplated a best mode, he disclosed that to be the preferred application of an alumina coating to a SiC whisker-reinforced alumina substrate, and had reached no definite conclusion that WG-300 was better in a technical sense than any other substrate within the preferred category (AR-166, 170, 171, 172).

The fact that Augustine may have tested only one mode or embodiment of his invention does not establish that he considered that to be the best mode, viz., better than any other embodiment. In other words, Suzuki has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Augustine, at the time he filed his application, considered WG-300 to be better than any other substrate for purposes of his invention. Rather, it is at least as likely that he considered WG-300 to be merely a convenient "off-the-shelf" substrate for testing purposes, and only representative of the preferred category of substrates. Accordingly, our view of the evidence as a whole is that Augustine's best mode is adequately disclosed in his application in terms of preferred categories of materials and processing parameters, and is not limited exclusively to the WG-300 embodiment. Other factors which support this conclusion will now be briefly discussed.

First of all, in our view, it is unlikely that Augustine would have envisioned his best mode as being limited to but a single substrate (WG-300) considering the diversity of conditions which are typically encountered in use, e.g., workpieces which are composed of different materials and processed under different cutting regimes. This diversity

would no doubt require selection of an appropriate substrate to produce optimum results for each particular set of conditions, and it is unlikely that one substrate would be considered optimum under all conditions. For further elucidation of this factor, see Augustine's specification (p. 10, l. 16-23); ARB-39,42; AR-171; and SR 37-38.

Second, we recognize that Suzuki conducted tests in an attempt to duplicate results reported in Augustine's specification (Table I, p. 14). SR 79-94. However, we agree with Augustine that Suzuki's tests have little bearing on the question of "best mode" inasmuch as each of the substrates tested were made under conditions deviating from those disclosed by Augustine (ARB-58, Table). Also, the alloy workpiece used by Suzuki was not the same as that machined in Augustine's comparative tests (ARB-59, SR 84-85). Additionally, as previously noted, Suzuki has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Augustine's contemplated best mode was limited exclusively to the single embodiment of his invention exemplified in Table I of Augustine's specification.

Third, testimony in this proceeding has brought out that the WG-300 substrate has a whisker content of about 25% (AR

34-38, 98). On the other hand, Augustine's specification (p. 10, l. 11-16) indicates that the "most preferred" whisker content is about 20%. This noncorrespondence is consistent with the view that Augustine did not consider the WG-300 embodiment of his invention to be better than any other, at least in terms of whisker content.

Finally, in reviewing the numerous court decisions cited by Suzuki and Augustine relating to the "best mode" issue, we find that our view of the facts and our legal conclusions are consistent with case law for the reasons noted by Augustine (AB 46-8; ARB 70-88). Since the case law has been thoroughly addressed by Augustine, we find it unnecessary to do so here on a case-by-case basis. Suffice it to say that our evaluation of the evidence before us is consistent with the two-step analysis set out in Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2d 1033, 1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Essentially, our evaluation of the evidence as a whole led us to conclude that Suzuki has failed to establish that the best or preferred mode contemplated by Augustine of carrying out his invention is limited solely to the WG-300 embodiment. From the evidence, it does not appear that Augustine considered the WG-300 embodiment "to be better than

any other" embodiment within the scope of the preferred materials and processing parameters disclosed in his application. Instead, it is at least as likely that he considered WG-300 to be merely representative of the preferred category of substrates; and chose it for testing purposes because of its ready availability as an "off-the-shelf" item.

V. Augustine's Motion to Suppress Evidence

We find it unnecessary to consider the specific objections to the admissibility of evidence raised in the motion since we have found that Augustine prevails in this interference with regard to all of the substantive issues raised at final hearing even when considering the evidence in question.

Judgment

For the foregoing reasons, judgment as to the subject matter of the sole count in issue is hereby awarded to Augustine, the senior party.

Accordingly, Augustine is entitled to a patent containing claims 1-60 corresponding to the count. Junior party Suzuki is not entitled to a patent containing claims 1, 3, 4, 15, 16, 18 and 19 corresponding to the count. Junior party Mehrotra



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is not entitled to a patent containing its application claims  
1-31 and  
34-46 corresponding to the count and, also, is not entitled to  
its patent containing claims 1-40 corresponding to the count.

	Marc L. Caroff	)	
	Administrative Patent Judge	)	
		)	
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		)	
	Andrew H. Metz	)	BOARD OF
PATENT		)	
	Administrative Patent Judge	)	APPEALS AND
		)	INTERFERENCES
		)	
		)	
	Hubert C. Lorin	)	
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